Soutenance de thèse de R. Dureau
Gestion collective d’un risque ravageur pour améliorer la résilience des systèmes fourragers. Modélisation bioéconomique de la gestion des pullulations de campagnols terrestres
En raison du contexte sanitaire, la soutenance se déroulera en visioconférences Teams.
Membres du jury :
- LUPTON Sylvie, Enseignante-Chercheure, Institut Polytechnique UniLaSalle, Rapporteure
- GOHIN Alexandre, Directeur de recherches, INRAE, Rapporteur
- MOSNIER Claire, Chargée de recherches, INRAE
- FLUET Claude-Denys, Professeur d’économie, Université Laval (Québec)
- MICHELIN Yves, Professeur d’agronomie, VetAgro Sup, Co-directeur de thèse
- JEANNEAUX Philippe, Professeur d’économie, VetAgro Sup, Directeur de thèse
- MOTEL-COMBES Pascale, Professeure des Universités, Université Clermont Auvergne, Présidente
Résumé de la thèse
Collective management of a pest risk to improve resilience of fodder systems. Bio-economic modeling of the management of voles’ outbreaks Since the 1970s, some territories located in middle mountain areas and strongly specialized in grass-based breeding have been undergoing intense and frequent outbreaks of a small rodent causing damages to meadows: the vole (Arvicola terrestris scherman). Every 5 to 10 years, depending on local landscape, fodder production of exposed meadows can be reduced by 50% on average, which can destabilize fodder systems and cause important economic losses. Despite direct and indirect control methods which are currently proposed, both collective dimension of risk management and associated costs reduce breeders’ intervention. Beyond efficiency of control methods, we propose analyzing the failure of collective action regarding institutions and incentives set up to increase breeders’ involvement in collective action to control voles’ outbreaks. Our goal is to determine relevant management strategies to create conditions for a greater involvement of breeders in voles’ control. Our methodology relies on three series of qualitative interviews with breeders and institutional actors 5 as well as on a modelling approach of fodder systems facing multiple risks (serious game) and incentives to collective action (multiagent modeling). We show that costs of collective action (direct costs, opportunity costs, transaction costs) are an important element to explain under-investment of breeders, but that we should also investigate more globally the lack of collective action as a lack of coordination. New institutionalism and social capital theory are interesting entry point to analyze this paradoxical state of latent group, as defined by Olson (1965).